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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to simulate the effects of two alternative social policies – individual and 
family in-work benefits – on labour market choices in Macedonia, with special reference to poor and 
females. To that end, we use ex-ante analysis relying on a combination of a tax and benefit micro-
simulation model for Macedonia (MAKMOD) and a structural model for the labour supply, both 
utilizing the 2011 Survey of Income and Labour Conditions. Results suggest that the proposed 
reforms will result in sizeable effects for the working choices of Macedonians. The family in-work 
benefit is found to be more effective for singles and would lead up to 6 percentage points increase in 
employment. On the other hand, the individual in-work benefit works better for couples whereby 
employment would increase by 2.5 percentage points. In addition, the effects are found to be larger 
for poor and females, the categories that are most prone to inactivity in Macedonia. 
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1.  Introduction 
Macedonian labour market faces several challenges, including low activity and high informal 
employment. About 36% of the Macedonian population in 2012 was inactive which is the highest in 
Europe, with the exception of Malta. Moreover, specific categories of the working-age population are 
especially prone to inactivity: females, young workers and low educated workers. In addition, only 
44% of those within the working age in Macedonia were employed in 2012 which is 30% below the 
EU-28 average. The gender gap in employment is 17 p.p., much higher than that of the EU-28. 
Informal employment amounts to about a quarter of the labour force and is more widespread across 
males, with 26% of then working without a written contract. 
Unemployment and inactivity are the main determinants of poverty. While overall poverty rate in 
2010 was 27.3%, the poverty rates of unemployed and inactive persons were as high as 50.6% and 
34.6%, respectively.1 Poverty rate for employed persons is 10%, though part-time employed persons 
face much higher poverty rate of 26%. The incidence of low pay among wage employees is 10.8%.  
The country has a relatively good system of social protection and social assistance in place. The 
targeting of social policy is satisfactory as social transfers considerably reduce the risk of poverty: the 
at-risk poverty before social transfers is 42.8%. However, at the same time, it creates some 
disincentives for the recipients to become self-sufficient. First, the lack of activation policies for the 
recipients of social assistance and unemployment benefit results in low incentive for individuals to 
take up jobs and large benefit-dependence. Second, disincentive is related to the sudden withdrawal of 
social assistance and family benefits once a person accepts a formal work on his/her record. Third, the 
labour taxation system is characterized by a regressive structure, making low-paid jobs unattractive 
for workers. 
Across the Western countries, social welfare systems have produced large payoffs in terms of poverty 
reduction. However, at the same time, they promoted social exclusion by keeping less productive 
workers out of the labour market. In recent years there is a shift towards policies that promote self-
sufficiency of the most disadvantages citizens (Bargain and Orsini, 2006) given that employment is 
considered as a major element of a welfare state (Socol et al. 2010). These policies widely known as 
in-work benefits or “making work pay” (MPW) policies are designed so as to simultaneously achieve 
both poverty reduction (the redistributive role) and to increase employment (the social inclusion role).  
Given the within-system disincentives for taking up (low-paid) jobs in Macedonia, there is a need to 
reform the system of social assistance and benefits so as to reduce inactivity and increase formal 
                                                        
1
 These are latest data published by the State Statistical office, based on the Survey of Income and Living 
Standards. The SILC was first introduced in 2010. The poverty line is set at 60% of the median equalized 
income. 
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employment. The objective of this paper is to propose novel ‘making work pay’ policies in 
Macedonia, by estimating their effects on employment, with special reference to poor and females. As 
most studies on the topic, our paper is focused on the supply side of the labour market only, ignoring 
the labour demand (see Bargain and Orsini, 2006; Immervoll and Pearson, 2009; Randjelovic et al. 
2013).2 This paper makes a pioneering quantitative effort to argue how the policymakers may make 
work pay in Macedonia, with a positive impact on activity, employment and poverty reduction. In this 
endeavour, we rely on the newly build MAKMOD tax and benefit model for Macedonia within the 
EUROMOD family and the adjacent labour supply model. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents some labour market and poverty 
indicators in Macedonia in a comparative perspective. Section 3 discusses the disincentives to work in 
the country created by the existent social welfare system. Section 4 offers a brief overview of the 
literature related to MWP policies and proposes a design of the MWP in Macedonia. Section 5 
reviews the methodological design of the study and the data used. Section 6 presents the results and 
offers discussion. The last section concludes and proposes recommendations to policymakers in 
Macedonia. 
 
2. Labour market and poverty in Macedonia: further motivation 
Macedonian labour market is confronted by serious challenges. These include: high inactivity among 
the working-age population, low employment rates, high (involuntary) unemployment, and large 
share of employment in the shadow economy. Table 1 shows activity rates by different characteristics 
of the working-age population in Macedonia and the EU-28. About 64% of the Macedonian 
population aged 15-64 was active in the labour market in 2012, which is by 11% lower than the EU-
28 average. Apparently, this large gap with the activity in the EU is created by low participation of the 
Macedonian females. This is related to the largely traditional role of females in Macedonia as care-
takers of the home and the dependents (children and elderly). Only one third of the young population 
in Macedonia is active on the labour market, which is much lower than the EU counterpart. In 
addition, activity is very low among low-educated individuals (42%) where the gap with the activity 
of the primary educated workers in EU-28 is 22%. This might point out to a presence of barriers 
and/or disincentives for labour market activity of females, young people and low-educated 
individuals, as well as their social exclusion. 
                                                        
2
 The overall impact of the MWP policies which are related to the supply-side labour market constraints on the 
employment depends indispensably on the labour demand. Weak labour demand in Macedonia is addressed by 
polices which reduce labour costs and promote labour demand (such as wage subsidies and reduction of the tax 
wedge).   
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Table 1 – Activity rates in Macedonia and EU by individual characteristics, in % (2012) 
Activity rates MK EU-28 Diff (in %) 
Total 63.9 71.7 -10.9 
Gender 
Male 76.6 77.9 -1.7 
Female 50.8 65.5 -22.4 
Age 
15-24 33.6 42.5 -20.9 
25-49 79.5 86.0 -7.6 
50-64 56.7 63.1 -10.1 
Education 
Primary 41.9 54 -22.4 
Secondary 73.1 75.2 -2.8 
Tertiary 87.8 87.1 0.8 
Source: Eurostat database. 
In addition, only 44% of the working age population (aged 15-64) in Macedonia were employed in 
2012 which is 30% below the EU-28 average (Table 2). The gender gap in employment is 17 p.p., 
much higher than that of EU-28. Young workers in Macedonia face very low employment rate: only 
1.5 of 10 young persons hold a job. 
Table 2 – Employment rates in Macedonia and EU by individual characteristics, in % (2012) 
 MK EU-28 
15-64 44.0 64.1 
20-64 48.2 68.4 
15-24 15.5 32.8 
 
  Males 52.4 69.6 
Females 35.3 58.5 
Source: Eurostat database. 
Although the unemployment is high among all individuals, the low educated workers and young 
people are particularly prone to unemployment. There is no gender gap in unemployment.  
As Figure 1 shows, despite the overall high poverty rate (27.3%), employed persons face relatively 
low risk of poverty. On the other hand, unemployment and inactivity are strong predictors of poverty. 
Females face lower risk of poverty, which is mainly due to low poverty of female pensioners. 
Regarding the household type, households with dependent children face greater poverty rate than the 
national average (29.6%).  
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Figure 1 – At-risk of poverty rates by activity status and gender, 2010 
 
Source: State Statistical Office, Survey of Income and Living Standards. 
 
About 11% of the employed workers (wage employees) receive low earnings (Table 3). As expected, 
informal workers, females, young workers and those at low-skill levels are more likely to receive low 
wages and potentially live in poverty. 
Table 3 - Incidence of low pay among wage earners, Q2-20123 
  Q2-2012 
All wage earners 10.8 
 
 Formal workers 8.5 
 
 Men 4.4 
Women 14.1 
 
 Young workers (15-24) 19.5 
Prime age group (25-54) 10.8 
Older workers (55-64) 6.5 
 
 High skills (ISCO 1-3) 2.2 
Medium (ISCO 4-8) 13.9 
Low (ISCO 9) 23.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on micro data from LFS. 
The analysis above suggests that some categories of workers in Macedonia are more likely to face 
social exclusion and barriers and/or disincentives for being economically active and working. To a 
certain extent, those barriers and disincentives are likely to be related to the design of the social 
assistance and benefit systems, as well as labour taxation. The next section investigates this issue. 
 
 
                                                        
3
 It is usual to use 2/3 of the median wage as a benchmark to distinguish low pay wages. In our case, given that wages 
instead of wage levels are reported in the LFS, we consider all wages below MKD 8,000 as low wages (actually wages 
below the wage range of MKD 8,001-10,000). Specifically, 2/3 of the median wage is at about 9,000 MKD which is a mid 
point in the range of 8,001-10,000. 
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3. Disincentives to work in Macedonia 
There are three types of constraints that poor and disadvantaged individuals face in their transition to 
labour market activity and/or employment. These include: participation barriers, employment barriers 
and benefit disincentives (World Bank, 2013). Participation constraints are related to some non-
market barriers which prevent workable individuals from supplying their labour. These can include 
taking care about the household and the dependents (mainly relevant for women), lack of information 
about labour demand, etc. For example, if the potential labour income of a low-educated female is 
lower than the cost of taking care of children, then she chooses not to supply her labour. Barriers to 
employment can arise from lack of skills and knowledge which are demanded by employers. The last 
type of barriers is those associated with the design of the tax and benefit system. In particular, if social 
transfers change the value that an individual (or household) places on leisure over work, then most 
probably activity will be reduced. In addition, the system of social protection might be designed so as 
to act as an effective tax on earnings particularly among low-productivity workers. While the first two 
types of barriers are important, this study is focused on the inherent characteristics of the social 
assistance and tax system that prevent self-sufficiency of the poor citizens. Hence, in what follows we 
focus on the Macedonian tax and benefit system and the (dis)incentives it generates.  
Similar to most European countries, Macedonia has a comprehensive system for social protection 
which comprises of: i) contributory benefits (such as pension and disability insurance), ii) passive and 
active labour market programs, and iii) social assistance programs for protecting income and 
consumption of poor. Passive policies are represented by the contribution-based unemployment 
benefit which is conditional on the previous work history. However, given that about 80% of the 
unemployed in Macedonia are long-term unemployed, the coverage of the benefit in 2012 was only 
9% (of the unemployed). Moreover, it is of short duration. Hence, the main safety net program in 
Macedonia is the social financial assistance (SFA), which is the major social assistance program. The 
SFA is targeted at households whose members are able to work but unable to secure themselves 
materially. The amount of the benefit is related to the family size (up to 5 members) and a maximum 
of MKD 5,515 (in 2012) or approximately EUR 90 per month can be granted. It is means tested, 
meaning that the actual amount transferred to a household is calculated as the maximum amount (for 
the particular family size) reduced by any income earned by the family/household. The eligibility is 
lost if the family earns more than the SFA level. 
The total spending on social assistance (SFA, child and family protection, non-contributory disability 
benefits, and war-related benefits) in Macedonia in 2011 was slightly above one percent of GDP, 
which is below the average regional standard (World Bank, 2013). The SFA program alone accounts 
for about 0.3% of GDP. Across the region, Montenegro spends close to 0.5% of GDP, and Kosovo up 
to 0.7%.  
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The social protection programs have undergone several reforms in recent years aimed at improving 
the targeting and efficiency. The introduction of the Management Information System (MIS) which 
provided an electronic connection among the social work centres (SWCs) has substantially decreased 
the number of SFA users through elimination of duplicative and flawed claims. Among the new 
programs and measures introduced in the social protection system, the conditional cash transfer 
program for secondary education is of greatest importance. The program offers a top-up financial 
support to SFA receiving households conditional upon regular attendance of their children in 
secondary school.  
As elsewhere, while the SFA program is aimed at safeguarding the income and social integration of 
the poor citizens, there are some concerns about its potentially negative impact on the labour supply 
and welfare dependency. Vidovic et al. (2012) argue that there are two interrelated elements in the 
process of activation of benefit recipients and their labour market integration. The first one is a 
demanding element; that is, whether an active job search is promoted by the legal environment. On 
the other hand, the enabling element should support poor and socially disadvantaged individuals in 
their job search efforts, as those individuals are likely to face some barriers to participation and/or 
employment. The assessment of the demanding and enabling environment in Macedonia shows that 
national legislation and policies do not provide a strong support for activity of the beneficiaries of the 
SFA (World Bank, 2013). Though, there are some incentives in the social system for speeding up the 
transition from SFA to work, such as: a) the declining benefit schedule (the benefit declines to 50% of 
the eligible amount after three years of receipt) and b) the legal pledge for keeping the entitlement to 
SFA while the beneficiary is engaged in a public work program.  
In contrast, the system provides strong disincentives for participation/employment of the 
beneficiaries. Firstly, the means-tested nature of the benefit implies that any income that is formally 
earned reduces the amount of the benefit received. This creates disincentives for the beneficiaries to 
accept any formal job, but instead increase their preference for non-participation and/or informal jobs. 
Second, earned income above the benefit amount results in an immediate withdrawal of the benefit. 
This implies a 100 percent marginal effective tax rate on earnings for a one-earner family with two 
children, going up to about 15% of the average wage when the benefit eligibility is lost (Figure 2).4 
This however might not significantly affect employment as the benefit is withdrawn at very low levels 
of earnings (or other income), much less than the national statutory minimum wage (MKD 8,050 in 
2013).  
 
                                                        
4
 Additionally, the marginal and average effective tax rates increase at about 33% of the average wage. 
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Figure 2. Tax Wedge and Effective Tax Rates for a One-Earner Couple with Two children in 
Macedonia (2012) 
 
Source: World Bank (2013) 
Note: The figure reflects the situation when the household earnings are related to working days in a week. The 
rise of earnings from 0 to 100 percent of the average wage is linked to the increase of working days from 0 to 5 
(full-time). The tax wedge is defined as the proportional difference between the costs of a worker to their 
employer (wage and social security contributions, i.e. the total labor cost) and the amount of net earnings that 
the worker receives (wages minus personal income tax and social security contributions, plus any available 
family benefits). The METR is defined as (1 – ∆ne/∆ge) where ∆ne is equal to the change in net earnings, and 
∆ge is the change in gross earnings experienced by the household, where the marginal change is 1 percent of 
the average wage. The AETR is defined as (1 – ∆ne/∆ge) where ∆ne is equal to the change in net earnings, and 
∆ge is the change in gross earnings experienced by the household, where the total change is from 0 to x 
percentage of the average wage (from 1 to 100 percent, as indicated on the x axis). 
 
Further disincentives are created by some additional entitlements conditional upon the SFA receipt, 
such as cheap telephone and television packages (of about USD 2.5 per month); financial 
reimbursement for energy bills; personal computers from the government; in-kind support from 
nongovernmental organizations and the like. These additional entitlements make the receipt of a SFA 
more attractive for a household rather than the two adults (parents) working at the minimum wage; 
they considerably increase the opportunity cost of a formal job (Mojsoska-Blazevski, 2012a).  
Besides the social and benefit system, the income tax system is likely to reduce the work incentives of 
low-productive workers also. Indeed, Macedonian labour taxation system is characterized by a 
regressive structure at low wage levels (below and at the average wage) created by the minimum 
wage floor for payment of social contributions set at 50 percent of the average wage. Such tax 
structure makes low-paid jobs unattractive for workers and hence discourages labour supply, while 
“expensive” for employers (Mojsoska-Blazevski, 2012b). Moreover, high labour taxation makes the 
work in the informal economy more attractive and might be related to high informal economy in a 
country (Bird and Zolt, 2008).  
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Table 4. Comparison of Tax Wedge in Macedonia, Peer Countries and EU (as % of labour 
costs, single person) 
% of average wage 50% 67% 100% 167% Country Year 
Macedonia 
2006 44.3 39.2 40.2 41 
2007* 41.2 37.8 38.6 39.2 
2008* 40.7 36.8 37.5 38 
Serbia 2007 37.6 38.4 39.2 39.7 
Albania 2006 34.1 27.9 28.9 29.8 
Croatia 2008  38.1 40.1 44.4 
Slovenia 2007  40 44 50 
EU-27 2008  37 40.6 45.1 
EU-15 2008  38.1 42.4 47.6 
NMS-12 2008  35.6 38.5 42 
”Excess” of tax wedge Macedonia/EU-12 (2008) 1.2 -1 -4 
Source: Mojsoska-Blazevski (2012b) 
* The reform and reduction of the personal income tax in 2007 and 2008 reduced the 
tax wedge. 
 
Table 4 compares tax wedge in Macedonia with the neighbouring and peer countries, and the EU 
countries, at different wage levels. High tax wedge in Macedonia, especially at low wage levels, is 
related to the expensive social security system that matches those in high-income Western European 
countries, a common feature of all ex-socialist countries (Rutkowski and Walewski, 2007).  
Over the last years, the Government has reformed the labour taxation and costs system, inter alia, to 
increase formal employment, given the distortive effect of taxes on labour supply and labour demand. 
These consisted of the introduction of a proportional personal income and profit tax system (the so-
called “flat tax”) in 2007, reduction of the tax rates to 10%, as well as a reduction of the social-
contributions rates as of 2009.5 The reduction of the social contributions rates in 2009 reduced the tax 
wedge to below 38% at average and above average wages, and to 39% for low wages.  
In summary, while the social assistance and benefit systems manage to reduce the poverty, their 
design is likely to reduce the incentives for work, hence exacerbating the social exclusion of the poor 
and disadvantaged citizens. Hence, it is important to assess the potential effects of implementation of 
policies which reduce poverty but also provide incentives to work and to reform of the system.  
 
 
 
                                                        
5
 In 2009, the Government implemented gross wage reform that consisted of several elements: introduction of a 
gross wage concept of wage negotiation and contracting from the previous net wage system, incorporation of 
tax-free allowances into wages, integrated collection of PIT and social insurance contributions by the Public 
Revenue Office, and transfer of the liability for payment of contributions from the employer to the employee. 
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4. ‘Making work pay’: Literature overview and policy design in Macedonia 
In-work benefits (IWB) or “making work pay” (MWP) policies aim at increasing employment by 
creating work incentives, while at the same time reducing poverty. They can be characterised as 
“paternalistic social welfare functions” given they include or signal the social value assigned to work 
(Moffitt, 2006). They are in nature different from the “traditional” social assistance measures which 
may be effective if well targeted but at the same time are found to create disincentives to accept a job, 
as we argued in Section 3. The US’ Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and UK’s Working Family Tax 
Credit (WFTC) were the pioneering steps in what are today well-known and widespread in-work 
benefits.  
When assessing the effectiveness of these types of programs one needs to take into consideration the 
intended policy objectives, i.e. whether poverty reduction or increased participation is the main policy 
objective). Moreover, the effectiveness also depends on the design of the program and its interference 
with the general tax and benefit environment in the country, as well the distribution of income and 
wages, labour supply elasticities, and so on (Bargain and Orsini, 2004). The common conditionality or 
eligibility criteria include: work eligibility (minimum hours of work per week), family eligibility 
(children in full-time education or younger) and income eligibility (income below certain threshold 
level). In the majority of cases, these benefits grow in proportion with the gross income up to a 
threshold (phase-in) and then are progressively withdrawn (phase-out) so as to target individuals with 
specific earnings levels or working hours. In addition, benefits could be conditioned either on 
family/household income or individual income (Orsini, 2006). 
A multitude of studies assesses the effects of in-work benefits, though mainly for the advanced 
economies. For instance, Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) found that the EITC is responsible for a large 
share of employment increases in US: out of the 12 percentage points increase in employment rates of 
single mothers between 1984 and 1996, as much as 60% of it was attributable to the EITC. Similarly, 
Meyer and Sullivan (2004) examined the impact of EITC on the material well-being of single mothers 
and their families in the period 1984-2000 in the US. Results showed that the level of total 
consumption of single mothers increased in real terms throughout this period.  
Other strand of literature conducts ex-ante analyses, offering recommendations for policymakers to 
implement certain type of schemes based on simulations. Relying on EUROMOD, Bargain and Orsini 
(2006) simulated two types of IWB: British Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) and the 
individualized wage subsidy scheme for three European countries that experienced severe poverty 
traps: Finland, France and Germany. They found out that the overall female employment decreased 
after the introduction of the working tax credit. The participation of married women also declined in 
all three countries, especially in France, but it had small positive impact on single women’s labour 
supply in Finland and Germany. On the other hand, however, results showed that both, WFTC and the 
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individualized wage subsidy, achieved significant poverty reduction in France, and to a lesser extent 
in Germany, as the increased participation of poor single women induced by the former substantially 
contributed to poverty reduction.  
Orisini (2006) assessed the impact of two major reforms on the labour market in Belgium in the 
period 2001-2004: introduction of a refundable earned tax credit (CIBARP) and reduction in social 
security contributions. He focused on the sub-population of households where both spouses are in 
working ages and have flexible labour supply (i.e. not in full-time education, nor disabled nor retired). 
Results suggested that reforms had positive but moderate effect on the participation and hours 
worked. Similarly, Blundell et al. (2000) found a relatively satisfying distributional effect of WTFC in 
UK, while they predict a mitigate effect on employment. Participation of single women was estimated 
to increase by 34,000 individuals at the expense of 20,000 married women with employed partners 
who were estimated to stop working. Consequently, the distributional impact of the reform, rather 
than the incentive effect, has been appealed to justify the large cost of the reform. Using behavioural 
micro-simulation model, Figari (2011) predicted that the introduction of the family in-work benefits 
in Italy would lead to an average increase of female labour supply of 3 percentage points. The 
individual IWB would have even stronger incentive effect for married women. Its introduction would 
increase labour supply for almost 5 percentage points. Similar results for Italy are found in Marcassa 
and Colonna (2011) and De Luca et al. (2012).  
To our knowledge, only the study of Randjelovic et al. (2013) simulates the impact of the introduction 
of a family IWB (FIWB) and individual IWB (IIWB) on the labour supply and income distribution in 
a transition country, Serbia. Results suggested that both FIWB and IIWB would trigger decline in 
non-participation, the effects of FIWB being larger for singles, while those of IIWB for married 
individuals. Both schemes would have larger impact on stimulating labour supply of individuals in the 
first decile of the income distribution suggesting that they have inequality-reducing power. 
Similarly as in the mainstream literature, herein we test and compare the effects of two hypothetical 
IWB: family IWB (FIWB) and individual IWB (IIWB). The latter comes in one scheme, while the 
former in three different schemes (Figure 3, Table 5). 
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Figure 3. Structure of in-work benefits 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income 
IWB 
                    F IWB 1 
                     FIWB 2 
                    FIWB 3 
                    IIWB  
 
 
Source: Authors’ policy design 
The IIWB is created to provide incentives for people with low hourly wages and not only for those 
with low earnings. It treats all workers alike regardless of their family status and is characterized by 
non-linearity as it phases-in at a rate of 0.36 and after the maximum phases-out at a rate of 0.37. The 
FIWB comes in three alternatives and is linear until certain threshold after which it phases out. The 
details are contained in the following table: 
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IIWB - Individuals in working age 
- Number of working hours at least 16 in formal economy 
- 50.000 0.36 0.37 
FIWB 
1 
- Single person in working age 
- No dependents 
- Number of working hours at least 16 in formal economy 
63.000 90.000 - 0.37 
FIWB 
2 
-   Lone parents working between 16 and 39 hours or  
-   Couples with children working between 16 and 39 hours or  
-   Couples without children working between 30 and 39 hours  
-   All working in formal economy and in working age 
85.000 90.000 - 0.37 
FIWB 
3 
-   Lone parents or Couples in working age with or without 
children 
-   Number of working hours at least 40 in formal economy 
95.000 90.000 - 0.37 
Source: Authors’ policy design 
 
 
5. Methodological framework 
While providing incentives to work through the tax benefit system emerges as an imperative in the 
Macedonian economy, no research has been done on the possible impact of the changes in the system 
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on the labour supply. This has been due to two constraints: data and analytical tools for such a 
simulation and analysis. However, these two have been overcome recently, as we explain in this 
section. 
 
5.1 Data 
This study is based on the first wave of the Survey of Income and Labour Conditions (SILC, 2011) in 
Macedonia. Earlier, micro-data suitable for this analysis were not available. The survey covers about 
13,810 individuals living in approximately 4,000 households. Given this is the first dataset of this 
kind in Macedonia, we hereby base on ex-ante analysis relying on a combination of a tax and benefit 
micro-simulation model for Macedonia (MAKMOD) and a structural model for the labour supply, as 
we explain in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. Descriptive statistics of the population are presented 
in Table 6. 
Table 6 – Descriptive statistics 
 Males Females 
 
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Demographic statistics     
Age  40.381  12.808  41.355  11.905 
Married  0.668  0.471  0.792  0.406 
Children <3  0.136  0.373  0.107  0.330 
Children >3 and <6  0.186  0.479  0.218  0.509 
     Educational variables     
Primary education  0.241  0.428  0.439  0.496 
Secondary education  0.602  0.490  0.401  0.490 
Tertiary education  0.157  0.363  0.160  0.367 
     Labour market status     
Employed  0.556  0.497  0.369  0.483 
Unemployed  0.432  0.495  0.286  0.452 
Inactive  0.012  0.107  0.345  0.475 
     Hours worked and wages     
Monthly wage*  23,491  13,166  21,460  10,445 
Hours worked  23.573  21.645  15.214  20.245 
Source: SILC, authors' estimations.  
* Conditional on being in employment 
 
5.2 Micro-simulation model - MAKMOD 
MAKMOD is a micro-simulation model within the EUROMOD family. It runs the SILC data and 
allows simulating income assistance, child benefits, unemployment benefits, taxes and social security 
contributions. For more details, see Mojsoska-Blazevski and Petreski (2013). MAKMOD allows 
reproducing the budget constraint for each household, i.e., the latent set of working hours and 
household disposable income alternatives, while the labour supply model rationalizes observed 
behaviour (Randjelovic et al. 2013).  
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5.3 Labour supply model 
The structural labour supply model we use herein is a discrete choice one (van Soest, 1995), 
appearing in two sub-models: one estimates the preferences for single and the other one for couples. 
The computation of the model relies on a maximum-likelihood estimation of a conditional logit 
function. 
Discrete choice models of labour supply are based on the assumption that a household can choose 
among a finite number of working hours. Each hour corresponds to a given level of disposable 
income and each discrete bundle of working hours and income provides a different level of utility, the 
latter being also dependent on a bunch of household characteristics (mathematic expression of the 
utility function can be found in Orsini, 2006, p. 9). The assumption is that each partner in a couple 
may work 0, 20 or 40 hours, corresponding to non-participation, part-time and full-time employment, 
respectively, leading to nine alternatives for a couple and providing a triplet of disposable income and 
working hours of female and male partner. Total income is the sum of net labour and non-labour 
income, pensions and social benefits, whereby only the labour income and social assistance are 
dependent on the choice for the working hours and the respective wage rates. Hence, depending of the 
person’s choice for working hours, he/she may be or not eligible for social benefits. The disposable 
income we use herein is the one computed within the MAKMOD (Section 4.2). 
For inactive and unemployed workers hourly wage is not observed, though. We rely on the 
predictions from Heckman (1979) selection model for their estimation6. Then, the imputed hourly 
wages are used to calculate the labour income of the non-employed for the three working time 
alternatives and the corresponding sets of disposable income. 
Estimates of the wage equation are presented in Table 7. All coefficients have the expected sign and 
the inverse Mill’s ratio (lambda) suggests a significant selection bias, i.e. a non-random selection of 
both males and females into the labour force. However, unobserved factors that make employment 
more likely tend to be associated with lower wages for males and higher for females. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
6
 The estimation disregards the following groups: non-employed persons under 18 and over 64 years of age, 
students, pensioners, persons with disability due to inflexible labour supply; employed with zero wages as these 
are likely not the result of their human capital, but a specific situation on the labour market; and self-employed 
due to the different factors affecting their wages. 
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Table 7. Wage equation for females and males, with Heckman correction 
  Females Males 
Hourly wage rate (ln) 
*Secondary education 0.550*** 0.092*** 
*Tertiary education 1.151*** 0.464*** 
*Age 0.053*** 0.005*** 
*Age squared -0.001*** 0 
Constant 2.444*** 4.389*** 
 Employment (1 = in employment) 
*Secondary education 1.283*** 0.773*** 
*Tertiary education 2.260*** 1.416*** 
*Child -0.076*** 0.061* 
*Partner 0.061 0.301*** 
*Age 0.139*** 0.181*** 
*Age squared -0.002*** -0.002*** 
*Receiving benefits -0.010* -0.065*** 
Constant -4.196*** -4.073*** 
 
  Rho 2.307*** -0.337*** 
Sigma -0.789*** -1.014*** 
Lambda 0.363** -0.113*** 
   Observations 2,799 2,843 
Wald test: independency of equations [Chi2 (1)] 379 21 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 4.70E-06 
Source: Authors’ calculations. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10,5 and 1% 
level, respectively. Primary education is the referent category. 
 
After we calculate the disposable income for all choices and for all individuals, employed and non-
employed, the next step is to apply the ML method on a conditional logit function so as to find out the 
preference parameters in the utility function. Similarly as in Randjelovic et al. (2013), we estimate the 
labour supply effects by comparing the predicted probability of each choice under the pre-reform and 
post-reform conditions. Predicted probabilities of the post-reform scenarios are based on the optimal 
behaviour conditional on the pre-reform budget constraints, i.e. the same estimates from the pre-
reform conditional logit coefficients, and the new income, from the post-reform scenario. 
 
6. Results and discussion 
Parameter estimates for the behavioural model are shown in Tables 8 and 9, referring to singles and 
couples, respectively. In the case of singles, income is found insignificant which may be explained by 
factors like underreporting of informal income; family/household income being more important than 
individual income, i.e. the case when spending decisions are made by somebody else in the household 
(World Bank, 2008); and lack of accessible and affordable childcare for singles with children. On the 
other hand, results suggest increasing marginal disutility of hours worked. The marginal disutility of 
hours worked is larger for females as they likely assign greater value to home-related tasks, although 
the difference is statistically insignificant. Further, the marginal disutility of hours worked decreases 
with the level of education, but only for females, given the higher reward of education compared to 
males (see Table 7). 
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Table 8. Preference Estimates for singles 
  Total Females Males 
Income 0.004 0.000 -0.025 
*Age 0.001 0.002 0.002 
*Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*Secondary education(a) -0.026*** -0.029 -0.011 
*Tertiary education -0.024*** -0.031 -0.022 
*Children(b) 0.002 0.021 0.002 
Income squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Hours of work -0.450*** -0.415*** -0.375*** 
*Age 0.003 0.002 -0.001 
*Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*Secondary education.(a) 0.103*** 0.110*** 0.053 
*Tertiary education 0.108*** 0.119** 0.112 
*Children.(b) -0.010 -0.039 -0.010 
Hours squared 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 
   
Income*Hours of work 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Fixed costs (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
  
      
N (c) 4,491 1,698 2,793 
AIC 2041.417 720.68 1339.435 
Pseudo R Square 0.388 0.445 0.36 
Wald test: joint significance [Chi2 (16)] 1277.829 552.949 735.181 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: (a) Primary education omitted; .(b)Dummy variable for single family with child 
 
In the case of couples (Table 9), marginal utility of income increases with the age of males only, 
which may be related to the increased need for spending in more mature families. On the other hand, 
marginal utility declines with hours worked, but the decline is constrained by the level of education, 
especially of women. In addition, parenthood gains significance in the case of couples – likely due to 
the small number of single parents – and it increases the utility of income and reduces disutility of 
working hours.  
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Table 9. Preference estimates for couples 
  Total Females Males 
Income -0.392    
*Age  -0.005 0.024*** 
*Age squared  0.000 -0.000** 
*Secondary education(a)  0.002 0.021 
*Tertiary education  0.01 0.03 
* Children(b) 0.067*   
Income squared 0.000   
 
   Income * Hours of work  0.000 -0.001 
  
  Hours of work  -0.408*** -0.283*** 
*Age  0.003 -0.001 
*Age squared  0.000 0.000 
*Secondary education(a)  0.038*** 0.019** 
*Tertiary education  0.050*** 0.022 
* Children.(b)  -0.020** -0.018 
* Female and male hours interaction  0.000*** 
Hours squared  0.007*** 0.007*** 
Fixed costs  (omitted) (omitted) 
  
      
N (c) 13,239    
AIC 3720.3   
Pseudo R Square 0.433   
Wald test: joint significance [Chi2 (30)] 2800   
Prob > Chi2 0.000     
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: (a)Primary education omitted; (b)Dummy variable for single family with child; 
(c)Number of couples in the sample (1,543) multiplied by number of choices (9) 
 
The coefficients we obtained here determine the elasticity of labour supply. The mean elasticities are 
presented in Table 10. Elasticities for single females are lower than those for single males, but the 
regularity reverses in couples. On the other hand, the findings for couples are largely aligned with 
some imminent characteristics for patriarchal-minded and traditional societies as is Macedonia, 
whereby the males have the role of house-breeders. In addition, the finding that married males have 
lower labour supply elasticity than single males may be associated with the larger living costs once 
family has been established (Randjelovic et al. 2013).  
Table 10. Hours of work and participation elasticity for singles and couples 
  Singles   Couples 
  
Females Males  Females Males 
Hours elasticity 0.365 0.483  0.455 0.348 
Participation elasticity 0.354 0.474   0.444 0.339 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Elasticities have been computed numerically by increasing by 1% the 
gross wage of males and females and re-computing optimal labour supply. 
Labour supply responses are averaged up over the whole sample. 
 
The result for singles, both men and women, are outside the ranges established in the literature: for 
example, Meghir and Phillips (2010) document a range for females of (0.65; 1.41) and for males 
(0.00; 0.23). Larger labour elasticities are obtained in the advanced economies even for couples. 
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However, these deviations could be likely associated with the large and persistent unemployment and 
the large informal employment in Macedonia causing workers to become less elastic in terms of 
supply on the labour market. The large presence of discouraged workers among inactive population is 
also likely to contribute to this phenomenon.  
Based on the estimated preferences in the utility function and the simulated changes in disposable 
income due to the introduction of in-work benefits using MAKMOD, we present the probabilities 
associated with different labour supply choices (non-participation, part time and full time) under the 
two proposed reforms: individual and family in-work benefits (Figure 4). Both reforms would result 
in a lower non-participation of singles (reduction by 5.8 p.p.) contributing to an increase of both part-
time employment (by 1.4 p.p.) and full-time employment (by 4.5 p.p.), the effect being larger under 
FIWB. In the case of couples, only the IIWB reduces non-participation and increases employment and 
the effect is smaller than for the case of singles. Consequently, IIWB reform would be more efficient 
in reducing non-participation of married persons, while FIWB in tackling the issue of inactivity of 
single individuals. 
Figure 4. Labour market participation choices  
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
In the next figure, we split the sample on poor and non-poor households and observe the labour 
market choices of singles and couples. We treat a household as poor if the disposable household 
income is below 60 percent of the median, which is a usual measure for poverty in the literature and 
poverty calculations. Such a partition of the sample is interesting since labour market inactivity is 
more imminent for poor families, as is observed on Figure 5 (left panel) (see also Figure 1). An 
introduction of in-work benefit produces sizeable results for poor singles: the share of full-time 
employment increases from virtual zero to 5.3% in the case of IIWB and to 9.5% in the case of FIWB. 
Part-time employment also exhibits positive movements under the two reforms, but overall the FIWB 
reduces the inactivity by substantial 11.5 p.p. With respect to couples, only the IIWB reduces 
inactivity by steering full-time employment to increase from zero to 5.7%. 
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Figure 5. Labour market participation choices for poor and non-poor 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Figures for couples are simple averages of the male and female participation choices. 
In the case of non-poor (Figure 5, right), the effects are much smaller. In fact, the introduction of the 
in-work benefits for non-poor slightly increases the inactivity of singles, which is likely due to some 
borderline cases who would opt for non-participation as the benefit fully replaces their income. On the 
other hand, the family IWB is still beneficial for couples, as it slightly reduces the inactivity for the 
full-time employment. This type of analysis suggests that both reforms would produce sizeable labour 
supply effects for low-wage earners, hence significantly affecting the poverty in the country. 
Figure 6. Labour market participation choices for females and males 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Finally, we observe the choices of males and females – both singles and in couples – separately 
(Figure 6). Expectedly, results suggest that the proposed reforms will have larger impact on females: 
FIWB would result in an increase of the desire of single females to work by sizeable 10.9 p.p. (both 
full- and part-time), while IIWB would increase the desire of women in couples to work by 2.6 p.p. 
These are comparable magnitudes to those established in the literature (see, e.g. Figari, 2011, for the 
Italian case). The respective changes in the case of males are much smaller in size: 0.7 p.p. and 2.4 
p.p. 
Overall, the analysis suggests that the proposed reforms will result in sizeable effects for the working 
choices of Macedonians. In general, the family in-work benefit is found to be more effective for 
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singles, while the individual one for couples. However, the effects will mainly accrue among poor and 
females, as these are the most prone categories to inactivity in Macedonia. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is to estimate the effects of two alternative social policies – individual and 
family in-work benefits – on labour market choices in Macedonia. As labour market inactivity is 
especially pronounced among poor and females, the paper puts the focus on their working choices 
should in-work benefits be introduced. As most of the studies of this type, we use ex-ante analysis 
relying on a combination of a tax and benefit micro-simulation model for Macedonia (MAKMOD) 
and a structural model for the labour supply. MAKMOD belongs to the EUROMOD family and 
allows simulating income assistance, child benefits, unemployment benefits, taxes and social security 
contributions. The structural labour supply model is a discrete choice one a-la van Soest (1995). We 
use the newly-conducted 2011 Survey of Income and Labour Conditions, which feeds the 
MAKMOD. The simulated wage for the unemployed and inactive persons is obtained from the 
predictions of a Heckman selection model. Then, MAKMOD produces the disposable income subject 
to the choices of working hours for individuals and households for the labour supply model. Finally, 
the ML method is applied on a conditional logit function so as to find out the labour-market 
preference parameters in the utility function. 
Results suggest that the proposed reforms will result in sizeable effects for the working choices of 
individuals and couples in Macedonia. In general, the family in-work benefit is found to be more 
effective for singles, while the individual one for couples. Namely, both reforms would result in a 
lower non-participation of singles (reduction by 5.8 p.p.) with a positive effect both on part-time 
employment (increase by 1.4 p.p.) and full-time employment (increase by 4.5 p.p.), the effect being 
larger under FIWB. In the case of couples, only the IIWB reduces non-participation and increases 
employment and the effect is smaller than for the case of singles. However, the effects are found 
larger particularly for poor and females, as these are the most prone to inactivity categories in 
Macedonia. FIWB reduces the inactivity of poor singles by substantial 11.5 p.p., while IIWB the one 
of couples by steering full-time employment to increase from zero to 5.7%. On the other hand, the 
family IWB is still beneficial for couples, as it slightly reduces the inactivity at the benefit of full-time 
employment. Expectedly, results suggest that the proposed reforms will have larger impact on 
females: FIWB would result in an increase of the desire of single females to work by sizeable 10.9 
p.p., while IIWB would increase the desire of women in couples to work by 2.6 p.p. The respective 
changes in the case of males are much smaller in size: 0.7 p.p. and 2.4 p.p. 
Important policy recommendation emerges from this analysis: the government – the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policy – should consider the introduction of the in-work benefits in the tax and 
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benefit system of Macedonia, so as to combat inactivity and unemployment, and reduce social 
exclusion, especially among the poor and females which are among the most vulnerable groups in the 
economy. 
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